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Abstract

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Transcript

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RD: As you can see, the film was rather a romantic view of Canol, done by a participant, a Mr. Richard Finnie, who was still alive when taken the photographs. In many ways looking at it from my perspective and using some cryptic language, it was a propaganda film, obviously. In my investigations touching on Canol I'll deal with a larger subject that I'd been pursuing for about five or six years looking at the relations between Canada and the United States in the North during the 1940s, during the war period and even after the war period when the United States really went into the Canadian North and the Canadian high Arctic in a big way. And Canol was one of the major episodes of that relationship. Now, Richard Finnie, as – I'm not taking his name in vain but I'll give you an alternative view at least – would consider Canol, it was mentioned in the movie, as an epic, in terms of construction and I think that's very true. I mean if there is anyone to be praised in that situation it was the crews, the construction crews, the engineers that were along the line, really pushing, pushing the line through, pushing the road through. You can't take anything away from that sort of activity. However, it was an epic in that respect, Finnie also in one of his books which was published for Price, Bechtel, Callahan, wrote about it as being essentially another episode in cementing the harmonious relations between Canada and the United States; well if you start looking at the evidence you will find that if anything, the Canadian Government in particular was scared out of its mind, frightened by the implications of American activity, particularly around Canol and the Alaska Highway. And despite what Finnie had said about cementing relations, the Canadians became very, very wary and very, very suspicious. In fact Leslie Roberts, a Canadian author of some note, who has just died recently [1980], once called and I tend to share this view after looking at the contemporary evidence, which I'll mention in a few moments, called the Canol project a junkyard monument to military stupidity – and you won't get that from the film but you'll get that from me in many ways because it was a aside from the actual work that was done and the blood and sweat that went into it, it was a total fiasco. Much embarrassment to the Canadians who allowed this, much more embarrassment to the American War Department, particularly when they were under fire by the investigating committees in the United States, in fact it was one of the first times, and I'll mention it now, that the American military used a cover-up by using the blanket in the shield of the national, of the national security. In fact they reached a point where they stonewalled the investigating committee in the fall of 1943, in late 1943, when they just said sorry we are not going to testify anymore, we are not going to give you anymore documentation. At that point the committee blew up and said, 'we'll get you'

and in fact the investigation was reopened in 1946 after the war and still didn't get anything, at all. And the fellow who headed up the committee it was now President of the United States: Harry S. Truman, he had been Senator at the time and said we might as well give it up; it's like flogging a dead horse.

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Now, my research is essentially based in, in Ottawa, in southern Canada with materials in the Department of External Affairs, both Canadian and American materials in the Department of National Defence as well. I was allowed at the time when I first started this project to get into material that was classified 'top secret'. There is a 30 year rule on archival holdings in Canada, it used to be 50 but they got rid of that. My argument was I wanted to get into the 25 year mode because the Americans, the United States policy is 25 year restriction. And I said well let's get, you know, the Canadian view. So I managed to get in to some material which has subsequently become open and I have published a few things on, on Canol. But what's important about Canol and I'll take the other view is that it was in many ways a fiasco and if you'll permit me for a while perhaps to read a few jottings that I have got here, some that will be presented again on Sunday morning, so if you've heard it here and don't have time – I better not say that – [laughter] – Okay.

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Now the Alaska Highway, as you know, was the first major project in the Canadian northwest, it was run essentially by the US Army, ultimately what became the large construction concern in the Alaska Highway. The northwest staging route, which was a series of airfields linking Edmonton [Alberta] to Fairbanks [Alaska] and the Canol project, became known as the Northwest Service Command, that was commissioned as part of the Northwest Service Command for this particular film. When the Alaska Highway was the initial project, I won't make too many remarks on that project today, but it was designed partly – well let me go back a step. For many years, late 1920s, but throughout the 1930s the United States particularly west coast states were pressing for a land link to Alaska. States of Washington, Oregon particularly but also B.C. [British Columbia] seemed rather interested in, in getting a link-up but nothing was really done, there were joint, there were commissions, a US commission, a joint Canada-B.C. commission but it always seemed as if the Canadians pooh-poohed the idea, and for good reasons, they always felt that if the Americans got in – you have to understand I am a bit of a milk-toast nationalist – that if the Americans got in, there would be no turning them back, literally. And this is what happened by 1944-1945 as you will see. So nothing was really done. The Department of Transport Canada had started to survey and plot a series of airfields which became, which were Department of Transport fields to link Edmonton to Whitehorse [Yukon]. And when war broke out for the Americans after Pearl Harbour [Hawaii], the United States was no longer neutral, she felt that Alaska was an exposed garrison, that it couldn't, that it needed bolstering. Now despite what the film said about you couldn't protect Alaska by using the inland sea lanes the, it wasn't really true, no one really asked the Navy, as we'll see, if they could protect those sea lanes. In fact the Army went ahead and completed the Army project and the Navy was left out entirely – and they weren't asked their two cents worth, whatsoever. But anyway, once war broke out after Pearl Harbour for the Americans, the Americans wanted to use the Northwest Staging Route to ferry planes into Alaska, from the United States, hopping from Edmonton using the chain of airfields from Whitehorse and beyond into Alaska. Also, there was a Crimson Route which went from central Canada, went from Chicago [Illinois], Detroit [Michigan] up to The Pas [Manitoba], to Coral Harbour [Nunavut] across to [Fort] Chimo [Quebec], that was another

route. There were all these ferry commands plus an eastern ferry command went through Dorval [Quebec], it went through Gander [Newfoundland and Labrador], Goose [Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador], and could hop across the Atlantic to supply the European theatre as well. So there was a lot of activity going on on that side as well. The Americans were pressing for the Northwest Staging Route – Okay. Now it was also designed to provide aeroplanes not only for Alaska but also for supplies and aeroplanes for the Soviet Union, which was at that point an ally, a bosom buddy of the United States – ever since the attack by the Germans, in what was it, in June, May or June of '41? Or would become after the Americans got into war.

0:09:28

The Alaska Highway is an outgrowth of certain things. The Alaska Highway, there had been this momentum for it in the 1930s but as I say, the Canadians stonewalled that for, for years. In fact the Canadian Military said "no, we don't think it's necessary." However, the Americans pressed for it, in fact F.D.R., Franklin Delano Roosevelt, upon the advice of the, the War Department set aside secretly, about $10,000,000 at one point to begin immediate construction of the Alaska Highway without informing the Canadians. Once that had been done, then they'd inform the Canadians that they wanted to build the highway and that the bulldozers were sitting there rumbling at the starting gate. The Alaska Highway was built partly because of so many plane crashes the Americans were experiencing on their way to Alaska; there was a lot, many problems with compass deflections, a lot of problems with pilot inexperience. In fact the Alaska Highway, the route chosen by the Americans, a route that they didn't like to begin with, a route that the Canadians didn't like at all, but never-the-less was settled upon was a route that linked the airfields and what it was designed to do, because the Alaska Highway, and I'll get to Canol at some point, the Alaska Highway was an auxiliary route to Alaska. And it was designed essentially so that the pilots could look down and find their way because they – many of the plane crashes were due to being lost in this country. Anyway, this is a costly, elaborate scheme, the Alaska Highway. Into this comes the Canol project which I consider an expensive afterthought, it cost the American taxpayer roughly, that we know of, at the time, $134,000,000. That's a lot of money in WWII terms. Finnie was right; it was probably the most grandiose and the most costliest of, of war time projects. In fact there were hidden costs probably up to the tune of maybe 300,000,000 altogether because you are not taking into account the amount of money paid to, to the troops in the area. Okay. – Yes. – Okay. Probably its best and I'll bore you to tears with this – I'll read a bit because – to keep the record straight and then I'll extemporise as we go along.

0:12:09

On April 30, 1942 an order was given in Washington to construct a four inch pipeline between Whitehorse and Norman Wells [Northwest Territories], a distance of about 570 to 577 miles. To build a 3,000 barrel a day refinery at Whitehorse; to drill additional wells around the Norman area, the Norman area being first discovered in the 1920s. The order also stipulated that Canol Number One as it became known, that pipeline from Norman Wells or Camp Canol to Whitehorse was to be operational, remember this directive came out 30th April 1942, was to be operational October 1st – same year – okay. A scant five months from the issuance of the directive. Now as we all know, as Richard Finnie pointed out, and failed to mention this, the pipeline was more or less completed by February-March 1944. In fact by February-March 1944 the Canadians and the Americans were giving up the line – the first time the oil was being pumped through – you are talking two years later. An incredible puzzle. Now what's

incredible are the events within the United States War Department which led to that directive, to build the line. A fellow by the name of Brehon Somervell, who was Commanding General of Army Service Forces, had made the decision to build Canol on the recommendation of a fellow by the name of Colonel James Graham, Dean of Engineering at the University of Kentucky. I should point out that [James] Graham was an old WWI buddy of [Brehon] Somervell's and they had worked together building, building rail lines in WWI. [James] Graham's proposal for the Canol project had been based on a one day conference held the day before the directive was issued April 29th 1942. [Brehon] Somervell under testimony later on said: 'We needed oil and we made a decision'. Everything seemed to point so conclusively to the desirability of having oil on that line, that is on the Alaska Highway. One of the problems was that no one knew what the oil was supposed to do. Was it supposed to be refined for the truck engines, that is regular gasoline or was it really designed to provide high octane fuel for the, for the aeroplanes, the aeroplane engines. In fact a 3,000 barrel a day refinery will give you a drop in the bucket of high octane fuel, believe me. In fact it was estimated later on, and I haven't got the figures at my finger tips that the total production of Canol high octane fuel would perhaps, perhaps fuel one mission, of a squadron, of fighters, and that's it – there and back. Okay. He said that everything seemed to point so conclusively to the desirability of having oil on the line that it looked as though this was an admirable thing to do. But [Brehon] Somervell knew nothing about oil and depended on [James] Graham as I suggested his old friend and railroad expert from WWI days. [James] Graham had listened, he said, to everyone I could get a hold of and once he had made his recommendation, this was his buddy [James] Graham the Dean of Engineering, he said he didn't give a Continental whether it was torn up, thrown in the waste-paper basket. He made a decision, once he had done it that was his job, couldn't have cared less what happened to it after. The April, the 29th April conference was the only meeting held even though [James] Graham had had two months before that to seek out expert opinion. Never bothered in those two months to find out just about what was at Norman Wells, or whether if he could initiate a feasibility study. Those in attendance at that one day meeting were not asked to provide authoritative judgements either, other people at this meeting but they weren't experts in many ways. One fellow by the name, a fellow by the name of Walter B. Pyron, a General, at the time he was head work for Gulf Oil, was merely asked whether there was a possibility of obtaining 3,000 barrels a day from Norman Wells. Sure he said. He wasn't asked about the technical problems because no one knew the territory whatsoever. Another fellow by the name of General Carter, who was fiscal director of Army Service Funds, you can see how key these people are to oil development, had no idea how much gasoline a 3,000 barrel a day refinery would produce, or how much men and material would be required, but he based his favourable view about let's build the damn thing on quote: "how oil has been developed out of my own State, Texas" unquote. Now any knowledge that [General] Carter held of the terrain between Whitehorse and Norman Wells, and this is in the testimony itself under grilling, came from talks with individuals or friends who had gone up there on hunting trips, that's it. Just a sec.' Go on and on, but you know – an Air Force General was asked if he'd like fuel for his plane, what is he going to say – no? He said yes. He said I wasn't called in to pass upon the costs, the engineering difficulties, the shipping difficulties, or anything like that. He said sure if someone came up to me and said, how would you like oil? I would take it. The only expert opinion came from officials of Imperial Oil who were brought in and they told the meeting that because of insufficient data, in other words they didn't know what was there, they foresaw, quote: "very great difficulties both as to feasibility and to the expedition of the places proposed." In other words they said, don't touch it, we don't have enough information on it, and yet the project went ahead. Now had [James] Graham used the two months given him to study the problems, the results of that one day conference might have been substantially different, being this is historians' hindsight. He would have learned almost immediately for instance that Norman oil contained a high degree of paraffin, as Finnie pointed out, which tended to precipitate at a low

temperature. Now Finnie said that the pour point of Norman oil was minus70 degrees, well it wasn't, it was about minus 40 degrees and that line was shut down every winter. Nothing could pour in that line, in fact the high paraffin content of that Norman oil, because, because when it got colder the paraffin tended to precipitate out and clog the lines and you had to send mechanical scrapers to do it, to scrape this line out. We are not even talking about all the breaks in the line, all the leaks and what have you. I mean it makes it sound like, well we won't get into that – I just sat back there – anyway… As well, the costs per barrel compared to other pipelines would be enormous. It would have been easier to, and cheaper, to take a chance on Japanese submarines and send oil along the west coast via the inland passage, sent to Alaska along the west coast and this was the view of many others, for example a fellow by the name of General Robbins, Deputy Chief of Engineers US Army and for some reason here's a guy who should have been at that conference and he wasn't. He found out about it the next day. And he commented that ten times the volume of deliveries contemplated by the pipeline could be made by barges already available at one tenth the cost and effort. Nobody had asked his opinion. In fact it had been estimated that at least one to two tankers a year sent by the Inland Passage to Alaska would have supplied a year's Canol production. I mean even if you had lost a few of the tankers it certainly wasn't going to have cost as much. I should point out that they said, they'd never talked to the Navy, they said they couldn't hazard that Inland Passage because they couldn't trust the, the Navy's ability to protect the sea lanes. Very interestingly the refinery which was built here in Whitehorse, that came up from Corpus Christi, Texas, was brought up along the Inland Passage and it wasn't scuttled at all – however, neither was the boiler that came from Hamilton, Ontario. But orders were orders and the War Department justification for Canol was based on review that the west coast sea lanes could be protected – could not be protected by the Navy. Yet at no stage had anyone, and this is in the Truman Committee testimony, at no stage had anyone asked the Navy's opinion. In fact [Brehon] Somervell, Army man, felt it and said it – felt it was none of their business. Obviously the War Department's homework had not been done but the project went ahead with a flurry of activity.

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By mid-May 1942, US Army engineers were ready to move with pipe, rigs and troops and the lead troops were supposed to be at Fort McMurray [Alberta] by 25th May 1942. There was only one problem that remained, they had no authority to cross the line into Canada, they hadn't even asked Canada at this point. The Canadian Government had been notified of the project on, on May 1st and had raised doubts about the soundness of the project. The United States Army was restless, much like a racing horse in the starting gate. And in fact Colonel Graham said, why should the Canadians be hesitant, after all, he said, we are paying for this development. And finally the Canadian Cabinet did get passive approval for the Americans to cross the line and literally bulldozed their way into the Canadian Northwest. And the War Department rolled on throughout the summer and fall of 1942 impervious to any criticisms.

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Canol Numbers Two to Five were conceived, these were other supplementary lines, the one from, I think it was Skagway [Alaska] to Whitehorse, the two inch gas pipeline, which was a smart line to build. In fact it was the one which should have been built and the others should have been left, to Whitehorse and then on to Fairbanks. No one appears could stop the American Army at this point. The October deadline 1942 came and went; the complex wouldn't be operational until the spring of 1943, 1944. No one it seems, and this is very, very clear from this damn film, no one had seemed to bother with the logistics of

reaching and operating in an unexplored and uncompromising wilderness with its literally under-developed transportation system, and you can see they had to build a system, on their own. I mean you can give them credit for that but my god, you just went into it and poured money and more money into the project. Muskeg, ill-defined mountain ranges, mosquitoes and blackflies, as well as the pitiful planning all conspired in the delays and losses – they lost bulldozers completely – they just sank into the quagmire and that was it. By September 1942 the United States Army's zeal to get the job done began to provoke the ire of the Canadian Government – without informing either Ottawa or for that matter, American authorities in the south, Army engineers began a road, one he talks about, and a series of airports, of aerodromes. This was of course to get the job done. Formal agreements had been made and now what was happening on the, actually in the frontier at Camp Canol, they were just going ahead disregarding the formal agreements and doing things they had no authorisation to do. Now and let me see if I can skip a bit here.

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Now the Canadian Government at this point had little to say in the planning and execution of Canol, but by the winter of 1942-43, seemed oblivious to the long range problems that American activity, unchecked American activity, could create. The war abroad of course absorbed more attention, and the Government's preoccupation was not to exercise – that was the Canadian Government's preoccupation was not to exercise control but to make sure that they were informed, in advance, of American intentions. Now this complacency would end. By March-April 1943 the British High Commissioner, a bit of a an anti-American, in fact a lot of an anti-American a fellow by the name of Malcolm MacDonald came up ostensibly on a fishing trip to Northwest Canada. What he was doing was really scouting out the situation. In early April 1943 he sent a very, highly secret and personal note to [William Lyon] Mackenzie King the Prime Minister, only six copies existed, Mackenzie King did not show his entire Cabinet this memo. Rather indicating a horror show and some dangers and pitfalls involved in future Canada-US relations, he said it had become quite evident that these vast undertakings were being planned and carried out with a view to the post-war situation, never mind the war, at the moment in the Pacific, never mind the Japanese in the Aleutians and in Kiska [Alaska]. Beside that was diversionary manoeuvre and both the Americans and Canadians, by this time knew it was a diversionary measure, it wasn't that great a threat. The Japanese were much more content to send balloons with explosives across the Pacific and let them land – land – have any of you been down to – have any of you heard of these balloons – they had explosives – I think one got as far as Saskatchewan – but that was a threat. Sure there were some showing on the west coast but they – were to instill essentially panic, but no real threat. According to [Malcolm] MacDonald, Canada was in a precarious position and the culprit was the United States Army whose enthusiasm was even beyond the control of Washington. Washington did not know what the Northwest Service Command was doing. And you've got to remember that by this time there were roughly 38,000 Americans in Northwest Canada stretching from Edmonton north and west and – see if I have it here – oh yes – for one thing the Americans considered this area and the Northwest Service Command as a battle command, they received battle, battle ribbons for their, for their work on the Northwest Service Command. When anyone phoned Headquarters in Edmonton they usually got this answer: the US Army of Occupation – which of course did not go down well with the locals. And what Malcolm MacDonald said and I quote this at length because as I say it was rather a key document in understanding Canol and the Canadian fears. And you've got to remember this is April 1943 and the United States is at war with Japan, the United States has a bosom ally in the form of not only Canada but also the Soviet Union at this point.

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He said: “It is surely unfortunate that Canadian authorities have little real say as to for example the exact placing of the air fields and the exact route of the roads on Canadian soil. The Americans decide these things according to what they consider American interests; they pay no particular heed to this or that Canadian national or local interest. This aspect of the matter assumes even greater importance when one realises fully the considerations which the American Army and the other American interests working with them, have in mind in all their efforts in the Northwest. Responsible American officers will tell you frankly, in confidence, that in addition to building works to be of value in this war they are designed, designing those works also to be of particular value for a) commercial aviation and transport after the war, and b) (and this is a very interesting point) – waging war against the Russians in the next world crisis. (This is even before the Cold War and the nasty Russians did to us.) With the same considerations in view the Americans are pushing ahead with the building of oil pipelines, the Americans are very alive to this and the possibility that further prospecting may reveal an oil field of considerable importance in the Mackenzie Valley [Northwest Territories]. American oil interests are watching the situation closely and reaffirming essentially there that nefarious company called Standard Oil – (I don’t know if any of you are familiar with Standard Oil, rather large at one point conglomerate or large oil interest which was forced to, broken up forcibly by the American Government. And their agent or at least their subsidiary in Canada was Imperial Oil. In fact the Canadian Government could not trust Imperial Oil because they felt they were just a front man for Standard Oil of California. In fact they even mentioned Standard Oil of New Jersey which was the parent company.) Now the political effects in Western Canada, (this is still Malcolm MacDonald – how am I doing) – the political effects in Western Canada of these developments may be significant, ([Malcolm] MacDonald said.) The American Army calls itself the Army of Occupation, much of this annoys the Canadian citizens of the Territory yet they cannot help realising that it is largely the Americans who are now opening up their country. The inhabitants of these regions are beginning to say that it seems the Americans are more awake to the importance of the Canadian Northwest than our Canadian authorities. This state of affairs tends to play into the hands of those western Canadians who are inclined to assert that the west receives little sympathy and help from Eastern Canada and that its destiny lies in incorporation with the United States of America.” Something we’ve never heard of before, or since.

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Now this may have been exaggeration, all of this on [Malcolm] MacDonald’s part, but never-the-less a special commissioner was appointed to be watchdog and look-over American enterprises to make sure that the Americans stayed within the bounds of the formal agreements.

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In reality the presence of [Brigadier General] Foster was really a holding action, he was special commissioner. In fact, initially, the appointment and presence of [Brigadier General] Foster tended to be a bit of a joke. When Brigadier General Foster came up to the Northwest and went to one of the, the companies involved in Canol, you had a couple, you had one that was doing a lot of drilling, some wildcat drilling, Noble Drilling out of Texas which was drilling around Camp Canol – Norman Wells area – in fact the United States I should point out, was given the okay to explore everything west of Hudson Bay everything north of sixty. They had a blanket authority given to them by the Canadian Government

to do all that exploration should they so desire. Noble Drilling was one company, Price, Bechtel, Callahan was essentially under Army contract to build the line and also Imperial Oil was involved. In fact when Imperial Oil, Imperial Oil was looking after the Norman complex essentially and Camp Canol – when Brigadier [General] Foster came up and said to the good people at Imperial Oil – alright how about giving me some production data and drilling data on what you've been doing – this Canadian company, this fine Canadian company said – sorry, that's top secret. He said, what do you mean, that's top secret? Well, we work for another outfit called the United States Army and so [Brigadier General] Foster said: "what do I do?"

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The major question resolving the American presence and aspirations remain. There's no way – there was talk by this time in the fall of 1943 you had after-dinner speakers like the American Ambassador to Canada a fellow named Ray Atherton saying: "these great, these are great projects the Alaska Highway, Canol, they reinforce our common links, you know, they reinforce our common heritage." And what it smacks of is 'continentalism' which is getting the bureaucrats, the politicians, the planners, the military strategists, at least in Canada, a bit upset. In fact a fellow, one of the right hand men of Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, comes to Whitehorse, he is rather appalled the fact that there is very little Canadian presence. This is all American work; you do have some token Canadian officers as observers along the line, it's very true. His trip in September of 1943 resulted in the flying of more Red Ensigns along the Alaska Highway and along the airstrips he said. He said at least the Americans, when they fly, they fly a big flag, they also had the courtesy of flying the Union Jack, he said – but they fly it upside down, never-the-less they did fly it and he said we have to have more Red Ensigns up here. Those of you who don't know what a Red Ensign is, it used to be the unofficial flag. Now strange as it may seem the chance to deflect American post war plans came from an unexpected quarter, the Americans themselves. You have to remember that the Canadians are worried about the Americans wanting to stay. The agreements that were worked out in 1942, between Canada and the United States said once the war was over, I forget what it was – six months or a year – bye-bye, you go. Okay that's it. Now the Americans were saying – hey – we may be on to something here – oil developments, resource potentials, and they are looking with a longer view to stay on. Throughout October and November of 1943 the Canol project and its creators were subjected to unrelenting questioning by Senator Truman, Senator Harry S. Truman special committee investigating the national defence programme. This is the Truman Committee I was talking about. Exposed were the messy details of how the project had been started, how the Army had turned a blind eye to its critics and how American money had been squandered. I mean if you think that was money well spent, you're sadly mistaken, I mean that money went literally down the drain there. And this was all exposed in these hearings. To the point where, the American Military, and I've seen a couple of their memos on top of a Canol file and they are passing it from one fellow to another within the War Department and they are saying: "this is dynamite," quote-unquote. And they hush it up. It's one of the first times that national security is used as a cover-up for the affair. Anyway, where am I? In what appears to be a cover-up the War Department refuses to continue and invoke the cloak of national security. Incensed the committee concluded in January 1944 that the War Department should be censured for its unintelligent consideration of the feasibility of the project and its alternatives. Never-the-less it said: "if the project is to be completed every effort should be made," and this is the committee speaking now to the War Department, "every effort should be made to obtain at once a revision of these contracts with Imperial Oil and particularly to the Canadian Government, which will provide proper post-war rights and safeguard the interests of the United

States." In anticipation of this, wheels for renegotiation between Canada and the United States begun in late November 1943. Now to Canada this development was cause for some alarm, in external affairs a fellow by the name of Hugh Keenleyside Assistant Under-Secretary of State at a special meeting in late November '43, that this case, that is the Canol case, is probably the first of a number of United States efforts to renegotiate wartime agreements with Canada using, using as an excuse the development of public opinion in the United States. In other words they were going to come to the Canadians and say, look, we have to renegotiate, the public is clamouring, we cannot provide Public Works projects for the people of Canada, because that's what someone said it was, without getting due compensation for all the money, time and effort we spent in this grand project. Never-the-less the revelations of the Truman Committee and the War Department's empty logic in defence of Canol now provide the Canadians with a lever for which they had been searching to freeze out the Americans. The Canadians decided to literally buy the Americans out. Buy them out of the Northwest Staging Route – that is the airfields and related facilities, they were going to buy them out, in other words they were going to spend the money, a strategy they had been toying with since the spring of 1943 but really didn't have the guts until the Canol, the Canol project came to a head. Canol had convinced the Canadian Government that the best course, the wisest course was to begin purchasing those items which, quote: "serve us best." Unquote. As a diplomatic ploy it might work to Canada's advantage to quote: "have our bid in on the airfields before having to take a strong negative line on any formal United States proposal regarding Canol." In other words they wanted to give a signal to the United States that yes, we will buy this but, we are – we are not going to budge on Canol. Because any changes to the Canol agreement would open the floodgates for the establishment of post-war rights on the part of the Americans along the Alaska Highway, along the chain of airfields in eastern Canada and even of course presumptive rights on the part of the United States to the oil fields. Anyway, negotiations went on. I better stop; I'll go along a little further. Negotiations stretched on, the Canadians for once, and this is admirable, were rather hard-nosed and told the Americans we will not consider your proposals and in fact the furthest Canada would go was to create a strategic reserve for continental defence purposes only, and that was it. And by the end of January '44 the Canadians were able to lead their American counterparts to that conclusion. The next stage which took place after January '44 was to extinguish all vestiges of US control in oil resources in the Northwest. Now a new contract was worked out with Imperial Oil, which essentially shut out the Americans from oil development and policy direction, and I won't go into the royalty schemes and the like. One thing though and finally to ensure Canadian interests would come first and leave no question as to who controlled this oil resource, the Canadian Government stipulated that it retained the right of taking possession temporarily or permanently of all or any parts of the areas, that is the oil bearing areas. This clause was included in response to the government either entering the oil business or the fears as they said, quote: "that the loyalties of Imperial Oil are divided. It is dominated by Standard Oil of New Jersey, a company which must necessarily maintain close and friendly relations with the State Department." Quote, unquote. This is from essentially top secret documents in, in Cabinet War committee discussions.

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Blah, blah, blah, where am I? I shouldn't say that…

Moderator: You've got it on tape now.

0:40:31

RD: Okay. The Americans asked the Canadians if they wanted to buy Imperial Oil, if they wanted to buy the Canol project, they said, not on your life, we don't want that they had first option. Imperial Oil wasn't interested, by 1947 Leduc fields in Alberta; they dismantled the Whitehorse refinery and took it down to Alberta. The pipeline was cut up, it was left in places for quite a while, it was sold essentially to a scrap outfit in, I think out of Cleveland [Ohio]. And I've forgotten – let's see – the Whitehorse refinery – complex was sold for $1,000,000 – the pipeline was purchased for 700,000. So that's not bad for $134,000,000 investment. A 1,700,000. And it was left for nature and the passage of time, at least I thought time, to cover some of the scars, I may be reopening some of the more ideological ones. And I'll end off on this, I won't go on to go beyond Canol and some of the bad lessons learnt from it. The Canol project was a fascinating endeavour involving on the part of those who actually built it with hard work and imagination. In retrospect the idea of a slim four and a half inch northern pipeline, the first of its kind, pales into insignificance when contrasted to the giant transmission lines of the north slope of Alaska and those proposed for northern Canada today. Yet the northwest defence projects and Canol in particular underline to both Canada and the United States the resource potential and the military significance of the Canadian Northwest. Well I would complicate matters if I went a little further at this point going into Arctic sovereignty and post-war developments. What's interesting, and I'll leave off on this, is that Canol was a victory for the Canadians, they told the Americans no, you can't go beyond this point. By '44, '45, that's what they said. Canadians had become very, very aware because of such instances like Canol – and Canol was the spark, that the Americans wanted more than just rights during the war. And so the Canadians, as I say, bought them out. Mackenzie King by this time was certain although Mackenzie King has been chastised and castigated, if you read some D.G. Creighton's work, if you are familiar with D.G. Creighton's work, as being, being a Yankee – he is one of the great Liberal sell-outs to the Americans. But by this time Mackenzie King, the least you could say was certain that the long range strategy of the United States was to gobble up Canada and he wasn't going to be party to it at this point and gave his blessings to these negotiations. What's fascinating for me, beyond Canol, is the fact that here they stop the United States in terms of the Alaska Highway and the oil, oil pipeline and the refinery complex, yet by '46, '47 the Americans are back in, not so much into Northwest Canada but back into the high Arctic. Here was a policy decision made in '44, '45 and yet it was almost reversed and turned over by '46, '47 and that's an area I'm investigating and have been investigating for a while – last year or so. So I will end on that – I'm sure there is much more – it's a fascinating subject and I'd be open to questions.

0:44:05

Questioner: Just to start off the questions – I was wondering if in the documentation that you read whether there was any commentary at all on the impact of this Canol project on the native peoples, along the road. It doesn't emerge in the published literature.

RD: I haven't seen – I haven't seen anything like that. I mean this wasn't a concern. Who cared? You know. No one cared. No one cared about the animals along the line, the fact that these pipelines would put up barriers and caribou and grizzlies and the like, you know, would just travel along the road rather than cross it, or along the pipeline. No. They didn't care about the environmental impact; when there were leaks along the line, in some severe leaks they would dig a ditch to collect all the oil and burn it off. One large tank at Norman collapsed while it was two thirds full. Spilling about, almost 47,000 gallons of

oil into the Mackenzie River [Northwest Territories]. Big deal. When the troops were up here – you know – the black troops that were brought up here were totally unprepared for what they, they encountered. I mean they came almost directly from Louisiana. And you didn't use black troops in the war, at all, they were not used initially in the war effort they were essentially used here, cooks, stevedores, things of that nature, they were hewers of wood, drawers of water, and they came up without any Arctic clothing whatsoever, they, and they were cold. And what they would do, and even the white troops would do this, they would start, set little smudge fires to keep themselves warm, and these fires got out of control and burn right across the country and no one cared. As one black, one black troop said, it was why bother this country was the land that God gave to Cain – so hostile. So you know, you don't see any ecological, environmental concerns – at all.

0:46:11

Questioner: I just have a question about the psychology of the time – of the forties – you're talking about how the Americans coming to Canada, but if I recall the Americans were dealing with Great Britain as well on the lend-lease basis where they were gobbling up air bases and taking 99 year leases across – it was part of their politics of the day – I'm wondering whether or not if this was part of the politics as well, the shift up into here.

RD: You after some nefarious scheme going on?

Questioner: [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt, sort of, kept it right in the open, they didn't, they made no bones about it – given that [Winston] Churchill – and bases in Gander [Newfoundland and Labrador] and all those sorts of things.

RD: Yes, that's very true, and also taking over, in the United States, British owned industries. It was one way of getting British investment out of the United States.

Questioner: Now one other observation – I did grow up on the Prairies and I did grow up in Saskatchewan and I was going to school and my community had pamphlets dropped on it – rather the school grounds, and we picked up the pamphlets warning us not to touch these things that the Yellow Peril was sending, they were sending across by balloons. And we were warned of those sorts of things, and the psychology, as a child or how I felt and we were dreadfully frightened of, of possible Japanese attack, as was the west coast. My father was an officer in the war at the time, posted at Terrace [British Columbia] where they expected that as a staging ground at one time and I'm just wondering your comments saying that the American Navy couldn't defend that coast.

RD: Well let's put it this way, they couldn't defend it one hundred percent. I mean what the Army asked for was can you guarantee a hundred percent protection. The Navy said you know – I mean, who could guarantee that … who could…

Questioner: I guess that leads to my question in that – it's not really a question but an observation again – the Battle of Midway which prevented the Japanese Navies from coming farther – which literally defeated the Japanese Navy or cut them down, had they been – had it been a reverse sort of thing – had the Americans lost then I would suggest that perhaps the Aleutians might have been a staging ground…and there may have been…

RD: The Aleutians during the Battle of Midway were a feint – to draw, to draw the Americans off. As far as I know the Japanese never had any intentions, really of, of, of, of initiating land, land operations against North America. I think you have to understand what the Japanese were doing in the thirties and even in the war; they were interested in what they called a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. And they said you know – they were carving up Empire, much like the Americans were doing. They wanted China, so did the Americans. They weren't interested in North America per se, all they wanted to do was establish a defensive perimeter in the Pacific beyond which the US Navy or Army capabilities could not penetrate, and that's what they were hoping for and I don't see them on the offensive in that respect. One thing that is interesting, interesting, because there is so much testimony on, on Canol, do you have it up here in? –

Moderator: We have some of it in the Archives.

RD: You should have the Truman committee stuff – I think you've got Northwest Service Command on microfilm.

Moderator: … have the Senate House Committee hearings.

RD: Yes, you should have that and you should have the Northwest Defence Command – it's all on microfilms. It's a project, an ideal project for someone – even Richard Finnie's private reports to the War Department don't speak like this – take a look at roll number seven. Microfilm roll number seven. And you get a different view from Finnie. I'm sorry I interrupted you.

Questioner: That's alright, I wasn't defending what you were saying, or opposing what you were saying…I was just simply…

RD: … there is a war psychology, sure…

Questioner: … there was a psychology…

RD: Sure there was and…but, but by mid-43 the American's had concluded that there, that there was no threat to the Alaska garrison, the threat to the Alaska garrison was minimal and yet this was turned around in the testimony, how come if this is true and you did this last July, August, I can't remember the date, why are you still building this? There was perhaps, and we haven't been able to figure this one out yet, some of the material was still suppressed, the possibility they were building these, these for as they said with a view to the next war. To you know, Russia, to get as close, as close as they could, within striking range and have a good land based supply, a highway, oil supply, to Alaska. The possibility of long range strategic B-29 bombers. But that's, but that's – I can't get into that yet. I don't know if that stuff is really true. – Yes?

0:51:40

Questioner: Is it too simple to say that they didn't want to give it up, whatever, 'cause they had to save face…. like they had already started?

RD: Sure, sure. What they were arguing was, again I would have to go back to some of the figures and I don't have them at my fingertips – they said: look, we have gone so far if we stop the project we are going to lose $54-58,000,000, you know, we might as well complete it. Sure that's part of the dynamics of any project unless someone has the guts to say stop, otherwise they will use any means to keep it going. And you are very right, very true and there was a cover-up in that respect. And you'll see that this cover-up extended to the Alaska Highway because the Alaska Highway was going to be put under the gun as well by Truman's Committee and you'll find about this point that the Americans on the Alaska Highway they start pulling back, they start leaving their equipment, their work crews are going back to the States. Alright. All the bridges, the spans, all the permanent stuff is left on the roadside, it's never put in place. The Alaska Highway was never completed. I don't care what Finnie says. The Alaska Highway was never completed. When the Americans said to the Canadians, well look I know we are supposed to hand this road over to you, it's supposed to be an all-weather road, whatever that meant at the time, and essentially it was a tote road, a pioneer road, a lot of problems, a lot of flooding, bad curves, bad locations, all the way through, they were supposed to readjust it, they never did this. When the Americans said we know the war's not over, we know that the agreements say after the war was over, I think a year or six months after the cessation of hostilities, this road is supposed to be turned over to you, the Canadians said not on your life, we don't want it, you haven't lived up to your agreement and yet the Canadians had to take it over. And for three years, two or three years thereafter, the Canadian, was taken over by the Canadian military and there were all sorts of enquiries about hey, when can we travel on the Alaska Highway because the American newspaper service had written back and said this highway has opened up the grandeur of the northwest. It's, it's got beautiful scenic, people when can we travel on it, when can I get a lease for a motel or a gas station. And, and the reason, the Canadian, the Canadian authorities who took the road over, were trying to rebuild the road, were saying well, that it is still a military highway. What they weren't telling people is, and you will see this in the documentation, was that it was the pits of a highway, and that they were embarrassed but they had to take it over. Yet they had to, because if they didn't take it over, again strategically or tactically the Americans would say well if you are not going to take it over I guess we can stay on.

0:54:31

Questioner: Is that one reason that it was turned over to the Army rather than to a civil administration? When the Canadians regained control of the –

RD: Yes, no, there, what's, you are talking civil administration – part of it was turned over to the B.C. government.

Questioner: I'm talking about the north of sixty.

RD: Essentially a Territorial responsibility, would be the Federal Government's, there was talk of whether or not the DOT [Department of Transportation] or somebody like that should do it. The Army wanted it, said they had the capability, they did have the expertise also it was a make-work project. Keep the Army going. It's partly true.

0:55:08

Questioner: But if there wasn't any of it turned over to B.C. it was all turned over to the Canadian Army.

RD: Yes, but at one point there was a transfer of portions of it, when was it ’47, ’48?

Questioner: It didn’t last long then. I don’t…

RD: Well I’m trying to remember, and you may be right. I thought that that portion was turned over. It was turned over to civilian authorities at some point but there was about a two or three year period when it wasn’t.

Questioner: Oh that’s interesting. At the time it was taken over by DPW [Department of Public Works], B.C. wouldn’t touch the Alaska Highway. I don’t blame them.

RD: Okay. Thank you.

0:55:56

Questioner: How much did the Canadian Government in 1942-43 separate the three projects? Say when Malcolm MacDonald came up and wrote the report to Mackenzie King that would be just at the point that the pioneer road was being finished and the Canol was being started.

RD: What they, what they started to do, and there were more than three projects, there were dozens and – there were probably over a hundred different projects going on.

Questioner: But I’m thinking maybe –

RD: They were the large ones, they started an inventory of these projects and they started breaking them down – Prince Rupert [British Columbia] was one project and the Canadians would analyse just what was going into that project, how much it would cost to buy, to buy out the Americans from that project. They would analyse Canol, they would analyse the telegraph lines, they would analyse the two inch gas pipeline. You know, those lines, Canol Number Two, or Number Three and they would say this isn’t worthwhile, this is worthwhile keeping, this is worthwhile taking over, so you know they were becoming very aware by late ’43. The aerodromes, the landing strips, yes. The Americans said look, we know you have your own specifications you Canadians about the airfields, we have better specifications. We have, we will build them, we’ll extend them, we will provide other types of landing facilities which will upgrade them beyond your specifications and we’ll pay for that, you don’t have to pay us back at all, and that was part of the agreements. And the Canadians said, they finally said, no, no, no we’ll pay for it all. So that you know in other words, you will have no claim whatsoever upon those airfields. And this was toyed, and this was toyed with in the spring of ’43. But they didn’t do it until Canol really heated up and leaks were, leaks were hitting the American Press in the fall of, in the late fall of ’43, early ’44.

Questioner: So the Canadian Government had a pretty good sense of what was going on even if they felt they couldn’t control in terms of each, of all the different projects – by that point?

RD: Yes, yes, their information service was quite good. I mean Finnie for example was up there as was Price, Bechtel, Callahan. There were other Canadians up there, Finnie was a Canadian, but there were others up there who took a different point of view. Trevor Lloyd at this point was with – what was it – I’ve forgotten the propaganda board that was the War Relations Board who put out blurbs – on Canol

and the like. What they were trying to do, what Canadians were trying to do was trying to give a higher, a higher visibility to Canadian participation in essentially non-Canadian activities. Because what they were writing back was, what was happening in the newspapers, leaks all over the place – American newspaper writers talking about the great Alaska Highway and where it was linking up, giving geographical locations, and the Canadians weren't, were supposed to under cloak of secrecy not say a damn thing. Now all of a sudden you would hit the House of Commons and someone said, how come the New York Times talks about this and we Canadians don't even know what is going on, and it was at that point they started loosening the reins on, on Press censorship. Yes.

0:59:32

Questioner: Is there any record of what was actually produced by the, by the refinery in Whitehorse?

RD: Yes, yes, but I wish, again I'd say I know there is because I've seen …

Questioner: It must have been awful small – it must have cost a hell of a lot per gallon whenever it came out.

RD: I had some – compared to some Iraqi oil fields at the time, at the time, just let me check, I'll tell you, again, in the testimony you'll find production figures that the US Army gave to the Truman Committee; you'll also find it in the Northwest Service Command's records. It's in the records – and that should be on microfilm here. I am sure it is. I know I have a copy back in Montreal.

Questioner: … through them, I haven't seen …

RD: Hey, I do have it here. So I'll give it to you. Okay, so it would be in here, along with a bloody parking ticket I got. Oh yes, okay, they initially, okay, initially, the project was supposed to have cost $38,000,000 and this is another view of it – said the cost per barrel would be, would be enormous and I said – even if the project had cost $38,000,000 as originally estimated, it meant that the line cost, the line would cost $7,600 per barrel capacity, that is the Canol line, as opposed to $824 per barrel capacity of a US pipeline in Iraq at the time and the Iraq line was twice as long and had a daily capacity twenty eight times greater. So you know, it's not cost efficient whatsoever. But the justification was: its war. And you could argue to a point, yes it is, but when the strategic situation in the Pacific is changing, you know, when you know that the Japanese had no intentions on, on Alaska, why do you keep going?

Questioner: Well they wouldn't have conceded that (_____???) enough for there to make a change in the war anyway.

RD: Nope. No, I was saying one or two tankers a year would have covered Canol production. And you know, you're talking suppose you lose a couple or a tanker or two. It's a hell of a lot cheaper. You'd lose lives, I am not talking in that sense but if you are just talking in a strict accounting of delivering oil no matter what the cost in terms of human lives – and that's why you know, this is supposed to be the great epic and I sat back there and unfortunately chuckling away, because what they had to do was, they deluded the country, it was very true, I mean you'll find C.D. Howe getting very upset about all these Northwest defence projects, timbers being used for telegraph lines, timbers being used for those pontoons, for the barges, and its taking away from, you know, a larger war effort. Steel is being used,

this was another one, it didn't make this paper, I'll give you another for instance they said, we need a four inch pipeline to go from Norman Wells to Whitehorse, in that interval you need ten pumping stations okay , that's a lot of steel. Now who's decided on four inch pipeline, never found that out, they found an inventory of four inch pipeline. If they had looked a little closer they would have found six inch pipeline. Now the last 110 miles of that, of that Canol project was six inch pipeline, it came up later. If they had used the six inch pipeline that they finally found, they would only have needed two pumping stations. It's a hell of a lot of steel and resource that's squandered, if you look at it in that respect. The planning was pitiful. I could use another word but its mixed company.

1:03:44

Questioner: Whatever happened to Malcolm MacDonald?

RD: He is still alive [1901-1981]. He's still alive, in fact I think he's coming, I think he's coming to Canada for a visit but not in any official capacity.

Questioner: Did he become Colonial Secretary for his (_____???)?

RD: I'm sorry?

Questioner: There was a Malcolm MacDonald who was a Colonial Secretary after the War somewhere… I'm just wondering if it was the same person

RD: He may be. He probably is. Probably is.

1:04:15

Questioner: Can you suggest – to looking ahead to some of the work you are doing now – what was it that happened between when Mackenzie King clamped down on American activity in Canada and the post-war period when the Americans started to work again in the Arctic. What was it that happened?

RD: The emphasis shifted – well yes – what transpired is again looking at the material, American and also Canadian, looking at external and looking at defence materials and looking at private diaries, including Mackenzie King's and despite what he has to say about his good, good and dear friend dog Pat. Have any of you read the diaries? You should read them, they are being microfilmed as a long range project to have them microfilmed or put on microfiche, from the 1890s until, until his death.

[pause in recording]

1:05:10

RD: The United Kingdom might be able as a first rate European power to hold its own against the Soviet Union, particularly in the Mediterranean and became obvious that the United Kingdom had slipped from that position and that complicated matters with the Soviet Union. In fact Stalin was right when he talked about Churchill, Churchill's view of the Anglo-Saxon Powers ganging up on, on the Russians. That was Churchill's viewpoint and Stalin saw through that. I'm not on Joe Stalin's side, believe me, but never-the-

less there were these complicating factors on the part of Great Britain. The Americans saw the Soviet Union as a potential enemy by the end of WWII. In fact they concluded that war with the Soviet Union was probable by 1951. Canadians doing a similar assessment, using similar materials, similar intelligence came to the conclusion that there were three periods in the post-war world. I won't go into A and B but period C which was crucial to their planning was that there was the possibility of war with the Soviet Union; possibility is different from probability, between 1955 and 1960. Okay. This is a top secret planning group in Ottawa [Ontario] called the Post Hostilities Planning Group 1944-45. Now the Canadians as I say don't share the perceptions of the Soviet Union at this point but the Canadians – the Americans do, for various reasons and again, this takes a long time to elaborate on for various reasons allowed the Americans back. One was the fact that, and we had limited options, they were a strong power. Okay. The other is the Americans had embarked by '46, '47 on the Marshall Plan; the Marshall Plan was designed to help Europe get off its feet and recovery. It was also designed to help bridge the gap between a war-time effort and a peace time effort on the part of America's industrial capacity, and what Canada wanted from the Marshall Plan, was to get in on the action. It had to play a little bit of ball, a bit of footsie, though I know I'm not using proper terminology but it was certainly true, that's what they wanted. So they are not going to be very hard-nosed. On top of this the Canadian dollar is slipping; by '46, '47 there is a dollar crisis with Canada. Canada was running out of US funds and of course her dollar is not standing up to the American. And so she is very wary about alienating the Americans to a large degree. On top of this the Americans encroachment, or at least perception of the next world war is different from the Canadians, the Americans figure that the next war is going to be fought over the Pole; that the Soviets are going to come across at the shortest distance between the Soviet Union and the industrial heartland of the United States and bomb the bejesus out of them. The Canadians don't see this, the Canadians see that if there is any war in the future it's going to be a conventional – not a conventional war but it will take place on the European theatre. Americans say no and the Canadians say, well maybe.

1:08:46

On top of this, again there are many levels you start peeling like an onion off – on top of this Canada's claims to the Arctic, and you start looking at the high Arctic, are rather precarious, she doesn't formally own a lot of this territory. She claims it but if you look on all official government maps you'll see Canadian boundaries around this territory but it ain't so, or wasn't so. Canadians are awfully touchy about this. The Americans are planning all sorts of expeditions saying to the Canadians: are you going to let us in, and the Canadians say, I just happen to have it here – I think I have it here – [long pause] – pardon my hesitations here – it's easier to read rather than my nonsensical writing. Alright. "The United States wished to establish its front line of defence in Alaska and Northern Canada because to the Americans the defence of the United States is continental defence which includes us." said General Maurice Pope in 1944 quote: "and nothing will ever drive that idea out of their heads. Should then the United States go to war with Russia they would look to us to have common cause with them and they would brook no delay." If the United States went to war with the Soviet Union and Canada said it was none of our affair, the Americans would say, oh yes it is, you know, you better get into it, and if they didn't and well what [Maurice] Pope went on to say was: "what we have to fear more is a lack of confidence in the United States as to our security rather than enemy action. If we do enough to ensure the United States, we shall have done a good deal more than a cold assessment of the risk would indicate to be necessary." What that means is that yes we'll do something, we'll show them that yes, we'll provide defensive measures because if we don't, the Americans are going to get antsy and they

might come in and do it for us and that's what the Canadians saviour the United States had to be reassured that Canada was doing its part in defence of the continent because this Post Hostilities Group for example said: "in the event of a threat against this region" that is the North, "failure on the part of Canada to undertake defence measures in Northwest Canada on a scale considered by the United States to be adequate or co-operate effectively with the United States in its defence would probably lead to the infringement of Canadian sovereignty by the Americans, by the United States." Unquote. In other words: if we don't do it and show the Americans that we are defending this area, and should trouble arise and if we don't rise, trouble rise between the Soviets and the Americans, and if we don't rise to the occasion and do more or less what the Americans expect us to do, they will come in and do it for us. So, we start measures of joint planning, because joint planning means, or at least collaboration, collaboration has taken on a dirty connotation, but it is collaboration because it would mean that we will have a say in, in the execution, the direction of these projects, the pace of these various projects. I mean by '46 we are allowing Americans, and I mention this this morning, into Operation NANOOK. Operation NANOOK was an American amphibious landing by US Marines on Devon Island [Nunavut], which is in the high Arctic, à la John Wayne – the title of the article, was going to be a short fun article: The Snows of Iwo Jima – you people don't know the 'Sands of Iwo Jima', most of you've never seen the movie, there's a some audiences would have seen it. How many of you are familiar with the 'Sands of Iwo Jima' as a movie? One or two and that's it. But it was an American amphibious operation. The Canadians finally gave their consent, they slapped their head and said don't please, we don't want Operation NANOOK, do it in Greenland. The Greenlanders, the Danes were smart and said: "we want to keep as much as possible, Greenland in quarantine." So they allowed the Americans, the Americans were brought up from Cuba. It was part of their tropical and Arctic warfare unit, an experimental unit, and they had landing craft, marines, and they roamed the ranges of Devon Island. That's another story. I don't think there are any films on that one. I don't think Finnie was there for that one. Yes. I mean, that in short is one of the reasons why Canada got involved after '46, '47 – a lot of reasons, and not all military.

1:13:39

Moderator: Does anyone have any other questions? If not, thank you for giving your seminar and we can have an informal meeting with people afterwards.

RD: Sure. Okay.

Moderator: Thank you.

[end of recording]